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Abstract 
 
A design approach is offered for individual tariffs 
for mass customized mobile service products, whereby 
operators can determine their contract acceptance 
rules to guarantee with a set probability their minimum 
profit and risk levels. It uses realistic improvements to 
earlier reported negotiation algorithms [1], and a full 
operator operational model including infrastructure 
and content acquisition. Value at risk and profit are 
analyzed when a random user has consistent 
characteristics to a survey group, so that risk and 
profits are pooled. This analysis is necessary to give 
the supplier business guarantees to enter individual 
tariff agreements. A full numerical case is given for a 
class of mobile service.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Mass customized mobile service products (also 
called in short form: individual tariffs) in 
telecommunications refer to the regulatory protected 
ability for an identified user to obtain from a service 
provider, by a bilateral specific contract, a unique 
service specific price corresponding to an individual 
request from the user specified with personalized 
service demand attributes and some duration [2].  
This research is carried out under the assumption 
that the market is fully competitive and customer/user-
centered. Our previous work studied the negotiation 
between a fictive user and a fictive simplified supplier 
[1]; the results showed that the implementation of 
individual tariffs can have a win-win or win-lose 
outcome when compared to the general public tariff 
offer. The current paper goes one step further by 
studying the negotiation between one user belonging to 
a survey group sharing some common features, and the 
close-to-real operational model of one mobile 
communication and content supplier. This model 
includes, amongst other features, the investments and 
provisioning costs for content, besides adaptation of 
the transmission technology to user-defined QoS 
parameters. 
The first goal of this paper is to study the 
equilibrium/equilibria of the negotiation games under 
the above close to real situation. The second goal is to 
help the operator as supplier of individual tariff to 
design the individual tariff contract acceptance 
decision criteria when, facing the variability of 
individual needs, he pools a group of diverse 
individual users together in order to make a positive 
profit with a high likelihood and with acceptable risk.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: 
Section 2 introduces the underlying negotiation model 
between one individual user and a supplier. Section 2.1 
describes the non-linear business model of a supplier; 
Section 2.2 presents a discretized negotiation algorithm 
which is suitable for real implementation as some 
contract features (like duration) can only be integers. 
Section 3 addresses the negotiations between a supplier 
and a user belonging to a survey group. A risk 
measurement approach is introduced so that the 
supplier can adjust contract acceptance parameters to 
achieve with some probability minimum profit and risk 
levels. Section 4 applies the approach to a specific 
mass customized service product; a numerical case is 
analyzed and the results are presented. Section 5 
concludes the paper. 
 
2. Underlying negotiation model 
 
The economic and social incentives of users and 
suppliers to adopt/provide personalized services 
combined with individual tariffs are analyzed in [2]. 
The theoretical framework of individual tariffs was 
built based on the behavioral models of the users and 
the suppliers, drawing extensively on economics, 
psychology, and sociology literature [2]. A 
computational model was proposed in [1], where user 
and supplier exchange technical, service and price 
attributes of a value added mobile service, in a “service 
design space”. The supplier announces the offering of 
a service; he publishes a set of services attributes with 
 corresponding values, including a price (public offer). 
A user who is not satisfied with the public offer can 
start a recursive Stackelberg game, where the user and 
the supplier take turns to optimize their own utilities in 
each stage of the game. We define an equilibrium as a 
situation in which both the user and the supplier are 
satisfied with the negotiation result and agree to sign a 
contract.  
The user makes decisions in a “perceptual space”, 
which is a e.g. 2-3 dimensional space compressed from 
the larger “service design space” designed by the 
common service demands across the survey group he 
belongs to. In this way, the user can individually make 
simple visible decisions, and will try to minimize the 
distance between a point ideal to him (target point) and 
the current negotiation status. Some of user’s 
constraints are dynamic and depend on the input from 
the previous round from the supplier. The mapping 
relation between the two spaces is service specific; it is 
derived from a user survey and a statistical technique 
called Principle Component Analysis (PCA); the 
coefficients are called PCA loadings [3]. Other data 
dimensional reduction technique such as 
correspondence analysis can also be used but their 
statistical properties are lesser known then needed in 
later risk analysis. 
The supplier makes decision in the “service design 
space”. His decision variables are primarily related to 
technical attributes (e.g. related to QoS) and are 
different from user’s decision variables. The supplier’s 
utility function is defined as the incremental profit 
from serving the demand of an additional user. The 
supplier’s goal is to maximize his profit. The supplier 
also has constraints. Some of them are dynamic 
(iteration dependent). The supplier updates the 
constraints based on the signals he receives during the 
negotiation.  
 
2.1 A non-linear business model of network 
and content provider 
  
Representing a vast improvement on the supplier 
(operator) model used in [1] ,this paper has been using  
a recent detailed close-to-real model of service related 
capital expenditures (CAPEX), operations 
expenditures (OPEX), and content acquisition costs 
and revenues. This model addresses the incremental 
costs and revenues from value added services and is 
rather generic for mobile services. The incremental 
revenue is mainly decided by the price the incremental 
user intends to pay, and by the contract duration, for 
the service corresponding to user requested set of 
characteristics. On the cost side, CAPEX is accrued in 
proportion to depreciation of incremental facilities 
during the contract duration with the client, and 
likewise for OPEX.  
Regarding specific features of this model there are 
first the non-linearities linked to the necessary wireless 
links, transmission and switching/routing 
characteristics with a possible switching between 2G, 
3G and broadband generic access; the corresponding 
infrastructure needs based on traffic requirements 
derived from the value-added service attributes are 
taken into account. Next, the model handles the service 
specific CRM, OSS, content storage, and billing 
aspects besides handling the eventual manpower costs 
involved in tutoring as in the mSinging service case 
(see Section 4 for details). Inspired by the production 
functions used in microeconomics, OPEX is estimated 
by a non-linear service provisioning production and 
cost function with explicit marginal elasticities and 
production factor substitution. Finally if the operator 
invests in content creation in connection with one or 
several value-added services using said content, 
revenues from it for the contract duration are accrued. 
In summary, the inputs of the model are user’s 
requests on the service attributes (including price and 
contract duration), and the output is the operator’s 
incremental operational profit before overheads 
(financial, administration, marketing etc.) from that 
user. The design of the model was estimated from real 
systems supplier data and further parameters were fit to 
real operator operations for a typical mobile operator’s 
geographical coverage. In view of its complexity and 
proprietary elements, we omit the detailed 
specification. 
 
2.2 Algorithm with discretization  
 
The non-linearity of the cost and revenue structure 
of the supplier makes it difficult to build the model 
using one simple mathematical formula. Thus our 
model is built using spreadsheets. Next, some of the 
decision variables in the model should take only 
integer or discrete values to be meaningful (e.g. 1 
month but not 0.9 month). Most of the commercial 
optimization software requires an explicit target 
function and takes continuous real values; therefore 
they can not be used in our case.  
To compute a function that has both discrete 
variables and continuous variables, we discretize all 
variables and conduct an exhaustive search of the 
respective optima by trying all combinations of the 
discretized values of each variable subject to user or 
supplier constraints. Discretization takes several steps: 
1. Generate sub-intervals for each variable based on 
its feasible region and a chosen number of intervals. 
The feasible region of a variable corresponds to the 
meaningful range of a service attribute. The number of 
 intervals is the same for all variables in one 
computation.  
2. Generate representing values for sub-intervals. 
There are three conventions to generate the 
representing values: left edge/center/right edge, which 
take the smallest/median/highest value of each sub-
interval correspondingly. During one computation, 
only one convention should be used.  
3. Map a variable to a representing value. When the 
value of a variable falls within a sub-interval, it will be 
mapped onto the real value representative of this sub-
interval.  
For the continuous variables, the result of the 
computation can be used directly and makes sense in 
terms of the service attribute that it represents. Their 
relative error is proportional to the discretization rate. 
For discrete variables, the discretization mostly leads 
to a real or fractional value. Thus the result needs to be 
rounded up to have a meaningful interpretation. The 
relative error is not only proportional to discretization 
rate but also related to the method of rounding applied 
to the result.  
The discretization rate can be indicated by the 
number of intervals. When the discretization rate is 
low, the discretization significantly reduces the number 
of possible values of each variable. This greatly 
reduces the computational complexity. But it is at the 
expense of less accurate results. The results are more 
of a qualitative indication of the service attributes 
rather than a quantitative one. When the discretization 
rate becomes higher, the result becomes more accurate 
and thus gives a quantitative indication of the values of 
the service attributes. 
In our computation, the user’s target point is not 
discretized. Given that the user can take only 
discretized values, it is possible that the user can not 
reach the target point (distance to target point ≠ 0) 
when all the constraints are slack. The constraints of 
both the user and the supplier are not discretized. 
The inputs consist of all the possible combinations 
of the discretized values of each variable. All the 
inputs will first undergo binary constraint checking. 
The inputs violating the constraints are excluded. Each 
input generates one output. The optimal result is the 
input that generates the maximum output, which is 
obtained from ranking all the outputs. If the maximum 
value corresponds to multiple identical outputs, we can 
either randomly choose one input that leads to the 
maximum value, or choose an input by giving priority 
rules to certain variables. 
The objective functions of the user and the supplier 
are continuous functions in mathematical terms; except 
for the discretization and using exhaustive search 
instead of algorithmic optimization, the negotiation 
algorithm is the same as in [1].  
User’s decision rules are:  
1. If the current optimization result is worse than the 
utility that he elicits from public offer, quit; 
2. If no solution has been found after two 
consecutive rounds of optimization, quit. No 
solution here means that user’s constraints exclude 
all the inputs. 
3. Otherwise, continue; 
Supplier decision rules are: 
1. If there is no difference between two consecutive 
optimization results of the supplier and supplier’s 
utility from the user’s request ≥ profit threshold, 
sign the contract and quit; 
2. If there is no difference between the two 
consecutive optimization results of the supplier 
and supplier’s utility from the user’s request < 
profit threshold, quit without signing; 
3. If oscillation happens and the supplier’s utility 
from user’s request ≥ profit threshold, sign the 
contract and quit; 
4. If oscillation happens and the supplier’s utility 
from user’s request < profit threshold, quit without 
signing; 
5. Otherwise, continue. 
Here “profit threshold” is a parameter upon which the 
supplier decides whether to sign the contract or not 
during the negotiation with a single user. 
 
3. Risk Pooling   
 
To provide personalized services and individual 
tariffs, the supplier negotiates with each user 
separately. The result of the negotiation, if successful, 
is a set of service attributes with user-specific values 
and a corresponding user-specific tariff. As a 
consequence, the supplier makes different profits when 
serving different users. Some generate positive profits; 
others may generate loss at an individual contract 
level. 
In order to have a robust business, the supplier first 
needs to have a positive expected profit across the 
subscriber-base. More precisely, the expected profit 
from all subscribers of individual tariffs must be non-
negative, and the contract number must be non zero. 
Second, the probability of not reaching the expected 
profit should be small and less than a given threshold. 
Compared to public tariffs, individual tariffs allow 
higher volatility of profit, which means higher risk to 
the supplier. But a supplier often has a large user-base 
even for a specific value added service. The risk from 
individual users can be mitigated by pooling the 
random profits across a user-base for that (class of) 
service offer. Here the assumption is that the risks from 
individual users are uncorrelated or have a low degree 
 of correlation. Furthermore, the supplier can set certain 
parameters of the decision rules, which decline 
extreme requests from the user. However such decision 
rules and the contract terms must not be so greedy that 
none of the potential adopters agree to sign an 
individual contract. Thus it is necessary to have a tool 
to calculate the expected profit and to measure the risk 
so that the supplier can adjust the parameters in his 
decision criteria according to his risk policy. 
A standard benchmark of risk is Value at Risk 
(VaR), which offers a statistical summary of risk. The 
concept is quite simple: for a given time horizon t, and 
the confidence level p, the value at risk is the amount 
of loss of the supplier over the time horizon t that is 
exceeded with probability p. In essence, it answers one 
simple question: “how bad can things get”?[4]. The 
idea behind VaR is to compute the value being 
measured (return, profit, etc) with regard to 
distribution of the risk factors. A risk factor is a 
random variable whose value will be realized during 
the time (0,t] and will affect the value being measured 
at time t.  
In the context of individual tariffs, we define the 
supplier’s VaR for a specific value added service as an 
estimate of the supplier’s loss across the assumed 
subscriber base, at a given confidence level for a given 
contract period. The calculated VaR can have a 
positive or negative value; with the negative value 
corresponding to a loss. When the value is positive, it 
should be interpreted as the minimum profit at a 
certain confidence level from a randomly selected 
subscriber.   
We use the Monte Carlo method to calculate the 
supplier’s VaR [5]. Due to the non-linearity and 
discontinuity inside the supplier’s cost-revenue model: 
the negotiation results (i.e. the supplier’s profits) do 
not have a linear relationship with the risk factors. 
Thus the supplier’s profit distribution can not be 
resolved in mathematic formulas but through 
numerical computation.    
The key step in the Monte Carlo method is the 
randomization of inputs, which should follow a certain 
distribution. Here the inputs are users’ preferences 
(target points), the distribution is found out by a small 
scale survey on the same user base. The survey asks 
the same questions as the PCA survey (see Section 2). 
The results are users’ preferences in the service design 
space. There are four steps in the Monte Carlo 
calculation: 
Step 1: obtain the empirical distribution of the 
sample target points in perceptual space. 
The corresponding target point coordinates in the 
perceptual space can be obtained by multiplying the 
preference data with the PCA loadings. The result is a 
reduced data set. Each row represents a target point; 
each column represents one perceived service attribute.  
Next, we need to check the correlation between the 
variables. If all of the variables are independent of each 
other, the multi-dimensional empirical distribution of 
the target points can be represented by several 
statistically independent one-dimensional empirical 
distributions; each distribution corresponds to a 
perceived attribute. If correlation exists, we can still 
check if the multi-dimensional distribution can be 
represented by lower-dimensional distributions. The 
worst case is that the distribution can not be reduced to 
simple forms.  
Finally, a description of the distribution is 
necessary. Non-parametric methods can be used to 
describe one-dimensional distributions; but the 
complexity increases significantly as the number of 
variables increases. For higher dimensional joint 
distributions, one solution is to use software to do 
distribution fitting. 
Step 2: generate random samples (target points) 
in perceptual space  
Based on the distribution obtained in the previous 
step, more target points are generated.               
In the independent case, we can use the one-
dimensional empirical distributions to generate more 
multi-dimensional target points. Each dimension of the 
target point takes a value generated from the empirical 
distribution of the user’s preference over a perceived 
attribute. The method to generate these values is as 
follows: first create a random number generator that 
provides floating point numbers uniformly distributed 
between [0, 1]. Then treat each randomly generated 
number as a probability and map the probability to the 
empirical cumulative distribution. The quantile in the 
cumulative distribution is the random value generated.     
In the dependent case, more target points (random 
samples) can be generated based on the specific 
distribution using software tools such as Matlab or 
SPSS.  
Step 3: calculate supplier profits 
The randomized target points are fed into our game 
computational model. For a given supplier’s cost-
revenue model including constraints, and an assumed 
equilibrium type, we can obtain an empirical 
distribution of the supplier’s profit. (see Figure 4 for an 
example).   
Step 4: calculate VaR  
By sorting the supplier’s profits we can obtain the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF). The VaR at a 
particular confidence level p can be calculated using 
the (1-p) percentile (quantile) of the CDF. For 
example, if there are 10000 results, the estimate of the 
95% percentile would correspond to the 500th largest 
loss, i.e. (1- 0.95)* 10000. 
 In the context of individual tariffs, there are several 
factors that contribute to the randomness of the 
supplier’s profit: 1) the nature of the distribution of the 
user’s preferences; 2) the variability in the operator’s 
cost and revenue structure; 3) the selection of 
equilibrium constraints and decision rules. 
The first two can not be controlled by the supplier. 
What the supplier can do is to choose the equilibrium 
type and change the parameters in the 
constraints/decision criteria. The effect of the 
adjustment will be shown in the percentage of 
equilibria, the expected profit and the VaR. Here the 
percentage of equilibria gives an indication of the 
proportion of potential subscribers from the targeted 
population. The expected profit can be interpreted as 
the average profit from a randomly selected subscriber. 
Given a set of decision criteria and a confidence level, 
if the value of VaR > 0, the supplier bears no risk of 
losing money from the pooled subscribers. However, a 
VaR > 0 does not imply that the supplier always make 
positive profit from an individual contract. When VaR 
< 0, the supplier has risk of losing money from the 
pooled subscribers; the risk increases as the value of 
VaR decreases. 
If the decision rules and parameters are set in a 
greedy manner, there will be less equilibria (contracts), 
higher expected profit and lower risk across the 
subscriber-base. An opposite strategy will result in 
more equilibria, lower expected profit and higher risk. 
The supplier must decide based on the total expected 
profit and the total risk, and adjust the decision 
parameters correspondingly.  
Of all the parameters in the supplier’s constraints 
and decision criteria, the most important is “minimum 
profit threshold” (see Section 2). Figure 1a, 1b and 2a 
give a simplified illustration on how the parameter can 
affect the percentage of equilibria, the expected profit 
and the VaR. (In practice, the shape of the curves may 
be much more complex). Based on an assumed 
potential subscriber, the supplier can also calculate the 
total expected profit and total risk, which is illustrate in 
Figure 2b. An optimal solution where the supplier can 
achieve maximum profit with minimum risk may not 
exist. The supplier then must base his decision on the 
total risk he is willing to take and the total expected 
profit corresponding to that revenue. Furthermore, the 
supplier can also adjust other parameters in the 
constraints and decision criteria to change the shape of 
the curves. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Profit threshold affects percentage 
of equilibria and expected profit 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Profit threshold affects VaR, total 
expected profit and total risk 
 
4. Case 
 
We applied the negotiation model in the context of 
the fast growing personalized mobile music services. 
Many operators have already begun to offer mobile 
music services; some can even be personalized (e.g. in 
the “Radio DJ” service by Vodafone, user can 
personalize radio channels according to their own 
personal tastes), but none of them yet offer 
personalized tariffs. Our service is called “mobile 
singing classroom” or “mSining” where the users can 
improve their singing performance by following the 
courses and getting instructions and content. Users are 
students who seek vocal training or want to listen to 
music via mobiles; the supplier is a mobile operator 
assisted by music teachers. 
The design attributes of the service and the 
operator’s public offer are shown in Table 1. User 
perceived attributes in the “perceptual space” is found 
out through a user survey and the PCA method. Our 
interpretation of the three most important perceived 
attributes are: the teaching intensity in terms of 
personal instructions and evaluations; the price 
performance of raw content in terms of quantity and 
quality; and the degree of mobility of access to content. 
A user who wants to take the public offer can sign a 
contract with the operator directly. The user who wants 
a personalized service and individual tariff can start to 
negotiate with the operator.  
 
 
  
 
Table 1: Service attributes and public offer 
service attributes range public 
offer 
1. contract period in Month(s) 1 - 4 
2. degree of use of mobile terminal 
from a converged operator 
1 - 10 6 
3. sound quality of music 1 - 10 5 
4. number of evaluations to have 
during contract period 
0 - 4 
5. number of questions to ask 
during contract period 
0 - 8 
6. number of songs to download in 
total 
1 - 16 
7. user’s bid for the service  for the 
whole contract period 
10 - 200 
 
 
The negotiations are based on the non-linear 
supplier model and using the discretized algorithm.  
Gains and losses (when compared to public tariff) are 
analyzed. The results can be a win-win or win-lose 
situation (similar to the results in [1]). The users, as the 
leader of the game, achieve gains. The operator 
achieves better results in some cases but becomes 
worse off in others.  
We also carry out calculations when the operator 
pools a group of user together. We run Monte Carlo 
simulations under different scenarios. To simplify the 
calculation, users’ preferences are randomized 
following a multivariate normal distribution in the 
perceptual space. 
We test how the profit threshold would affect the 
operator’s expected profit, VaR etc. The profit 
thresholds are set to 0, -10, -20 in different scenarios. 
Each scenario has about 5000 runs. Figure 3 shows the 
distribution of users’ utility in the equilibria (minimum 
profit threshold =0). The dotted line represents the 
average utility of the users. Figure 4 and 5 shows the 
operator’s profit distribution when minimum profit 
threshold = 0, the dotted line represents the operator’s 
average profit. It can be seen from Figure 5 that losses 
from individual contracts are made. Furthermore, the 
expected profits are slightly different in Figure 4 and 5. 
The results of the different scenarios are summarized 
in Table 2. 
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Figure 3: User’s utility distribution   
 (minimum profit threshold = 0) 
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Figure 4: Operator’s profit distribution 
(minimum profit threshold = -0) 
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Figure 5: Operator’s profit distribution 
 (minimum profit threshold = - 20) 
 
 By decreasing the profit threshold from 0 to -20, the 
percentage of equilibria increases by 0.75%; the users’ 
expected utility increases by 1.2%; the cost is the 
operator’s expected utility (profit), which decreases by 
0.49%. The VaR at 95% confidence level are all 
positive, which indicate the operator does not have a 
risk of making negative profit across the subscriber 
base. However, the VaR is decreasing much faster 
(23%) than other parameters. For an assumed potential 
users (e.g. 10000), the total expected profit increases 
by 1.2%. 
 
Table 2: Results from different scenarios 
Profit threshold   Equilibria Statistics 
=0 =-20 
Proportion of equilibria 43.63% 44.38% 
Expected user utility 0.242 0.245 
Expected operator utility 34.5 34.3 
VaR @ 95% confidence level 7.2 5.5 
 
If we decrease the profit threshold further, we can 
anticipate that the proportion of equilibria will increase 
further; the operator’s expected utility will decrease 
and risk will increase. But these three variables may 
change at different speeds; the joint effect can be a 
non-linear total expected profit curve (or total risk 
curve); which may be similar to Figure 2b. Operator 
then needs to make decision based on the computed 
curves and his own risk policy.     
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This research moves a step further toward the 
realization of individual tariffs when compared to [1]. 
The equilibria of the negotiation between one user 
inside a survey group and an approximately real 
supplier show that individual tariffs for mobile services 
can be beneficial to both parties. Furthermore, by 
allowing for personalization not only at configuration 
but also at tariff level, the supplier can reduce churn [6], 
which currently causes huge expenses to the operators.  
The risk management approach we introduce allows 
the supplier to set the parameters of the contract 
acceptance criteria based on his own risk policy and 
couples it directly to his mobile and content 
distribution assets.  
Although the tools developed are rather generic and 
can be used for different classes of services, further 
work is needed to show the potential of individual 
tariffs even for basic services packages with very large 
subscriber numbers, as well as for communities of 
users (including business communities). 
 
References: 
 
[1] H. Chen and L.-F. Pau, "Individual Tariffs for Mobile 
Services: Theoretical Framework and a 
Computational Case in Mobile Music," presented at 
International Conference on Mobile Business 
(ICMB'06), 2006. 
[2] H. Chen and L.-F. Pau, "Individual Tariffs for Mobile 
Communication Services," presented at 16th Biennial 
Conference of the International Telecommunications 
Society, Beijing, 2006. 
[3] J. M. Lattin, J. D. Carroll, and P. E. Green, Analyzing 
multivariate data. Pacific Grove, CA: 
Thomson/Brooks/Cole, 2003. 
[4] J. Hull, Options, futures, and other derivatives: 
Prentice Hall Upper Saddle River, NJ, 2003. 
[5] T. J. Linsmeier and N. D. Pearson, Risk 
Measurement: An Introduction to Value at Risk: 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Dept. of 
Agricultural and Consumer Economics, 1996. 
[6] K. Wieland, "The customer retention challenge," in 
Telecommunications International, vol. 40, 2006, pp. 
8. 
 
 
Publications in the Report Series Research∗ in Management 
 
ERIM Research Program: “Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems” 
 
2007 
 
India: a Case of Fragile Wireless Service and Technology Adoption? 
L-F Pau and J. Motiwalla 
ERS-2007-011-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9043
 
Some Comments on the Question Whether Co-occurrence Data Should Be Normalized 
Ludo Waltman and Nees Jan van Eck 
ERS-2007-017-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/9401
 
Extended Producer Responsibility in the Aviation Sector 
Marisa P. de Brito, Erwin A. van der Laan and Brijan D. Irion 
ERS-2007-025-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10068
 
Logistics Information and Knowledge Management Issues in Humanitarian Aid Organizations 
Erwin A. van der Laan, Marisa P. de Brito and S. Vermaesen 
ERS-2007-026-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10071
 
Bibliometric Mapping of the Computational Intelligence Field 
Nees Jan van Eck and Ludo Waltman 
ERS-2007-027-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10073
 
Approximating the Randomized Hitting Time Distribution of a Non-stationary Gamma Process 
J.B.G. Frenk and R.P. Nicolai 
ERS-2007-031-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10149
 
Application of a General Risk Management Model to Portfolio Optimization Problems with Elliptical Distributed Returns for 
Risk Neutral and Risk Averse Decision Makers 
Bahar Kaynar, S. Ilker Birbil and J.B.G. Frenk 
ERS-2007-032-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10151
 
Optimal Zone Boundaries for Two-class-based Compact 3D AS/RS 
Yugang Yu and M.B.M. de Koster 
ERS-2007-034-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10180  
 
Portfolios of Exchange Relationships: An Empirical Investigation of an Online Marketplace for IT Services 
Uladzimir Radkevitch, Eric van Heck and Otto Koppius 
ERS-2007-035-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10072
 
From Closed-Loop to Sustainable Supply Chains: The WEEE case 
J. Quariguasi Frota Neto, G. Walther, J.Bloemhof, J.A.E.E van Nunen and T.Spengler 
ERS-2007-036-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10176  
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Methodology for Assessing Eco-Efficiency in Logistics Networks 
J. Quariguasi Frota Neto, G. Walther, J.Bloemhof, J.A.E.E van Nunen and T.Spengler 
ERS-2007-037-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10177  
 
Strategic and Operational Management of Supplier Involvement in New Product Development: a Contingency Perspective 
Ferrie E.A. van Echtelt, Finn Wynstra and  Arjan J. van Weele 
ERS-2007-040-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10456  
 
How Will Online Affiliate Marketing Networks Impact Search Engine Rankings? 
David Janssen and Eric van Heck 
ERS-2007-042-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10458  
 
Modelling and Optimizing Imperfect Maintenance of Coatings on Steel Structures 
R.P. Nicolai, J.B.G. Frenk and R. Dekker 
ERS-2007-043-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10455  
 
Human Knowledge Resources and Interorganizational Systems 
Mohammed Ibrahim, Pieter Ribbers and Bert Bettonvil 
ERS-2007-046-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10457  
 
Revenue Management and Demand Fulllment: Matching Applications, Models, and Software 
Rainer Quante, Herbert Meyr and Moritz Fleischmann 
ERS-2007-050-LIS 
http://hdl.handle.net/1765/10464  
 
Mass Customization in Wireless Communication Services: Individual Service Bundles and Tariffs 
Hong Chen and Louis-Francois Pau 
ERS-2007-051-LIS 
 
 
Individual Tariffs for Mobile Services: Analysis of Operator Business and Risk Consequences 
Hong Chen and Louis-Francois Pau 
ERS-2007-052-LIS 
 
 
Individual Tariffs for Mobile Services: Theoretical Framework and a Computational Case in Mobile Music 
Hong Chen and Louis-Francois Pau 
ERS-2007-053-LIS 
 
 
Individual Tariffs for Mobile Communication Services 
Hong Chen and Louis-Francois Pau 
ERS-2007-054-LIS 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
∗  A complete overview of the ERIM Report Series Research in Management: 
https://ep.eur.nl/handle/1765/1
 
 ERIM Research Programs: 
 LIS Business Processes, Logistics and Information Systems 
 ORG Organizing for Performance 
 MKT Marketing 
 F&A Finance and Accounting 
 STR Strategy and Entrepreneurship  
